AD NUMBER

AD500302

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM:

DoD Controlling Organization: Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

31 Dec 1974 per General Declassification Schedule, DoD 5200.1-r; Adjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

(11) 21 Nov 68

(12) 31 p.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

(9) Operational rpt. for period ending 31 Oct 68.)

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (26 Feb 69) FOR (19) OT-UT-684327 5 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U).

(18) OACSFOR

SEE DISTRIBUTION

"This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Sections 793 and 794. Its transmission [illegible] in any manner to [illegible] by law."

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1 = 150)

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
Research Analysis Corporation
Defense Documentation Center
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
Joint Action Control Office
Commanding Generals
  US Army Materiel Command
  US Army STRATCOM
  1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM)
Commanding Officers
  US Army Limited War Laboratory
  US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE (USASTRATCOM)
APO San Francisco 96384

SCCPV-OP-CR

31 NOV 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. During the period of this report the 1st Signal Brigade was operational in performing its mission of providing communication-electronics support for free world forces located throughout Vietnam and Thailand. The Brigade continued to perform its mission under the operational control of CG, United States Army Vietnam, while remaining under the command of CG, United States Army Strategic Communications Command. 1st Signal Brigade was operational during the entire ninety-two day period of the report. A detailed list of the significant operational events of the quarter is listed in the paragraphs below.

b. During the reporting quarter, there was a notable decrease in enemy activity recorded by 1st Signal Brigade Site personnel. The number of incidents of enemy standoff attacks by mortar, rocket, or small arms fire recorded for the reporting period totaled 248 which was a significant decrease from the number of incidents recorded for the previous period (397). However, the enemy continues to initiate ground attacks directed against isolated signal sites and can be expected to continue this type of attack. Increased emphasis upon site security, construction of defensive fortifications, improved defensive measures and an aggressive defensive reaction by site personnel have reduced the effectiveness of such attacks. Two major ground attacks against signal installations occurred at the Vung Chua Mountain and Nui Ba Den sites. Accounts of these incidents are detailed in paragraphs 1b (1) and 1b (2) below.

(1) On 12 August 1968, at 0135H the 1st Signal Brigade communications site at Vung Chua Mountain, 2 KM Southwest of the city of Qui Nhon came under a coordinated mortar and ground attack, part of which was by infiltration. Five minutes of preparatory fire was followed by a breach of the perimeter and small arms fire. At the same time as the small arms fire was taking place, satchel charges began to go off throughout the area. At the main gate, the guard was killed by small arms fire as well as the force of a satchel charge explosion as he engaged the enemy from his post guarding the gate. Resistance to the enemy attack was stubborn and resulted in the withdrawal of the attackers. The outcome of the action was 2 friendly KHA and 12 WHA with the enemy suffering 9 KIA and unknown wounded. All known enemy casualties occurred within the perimeter. Throughout the enemy attack communications remained operational and the only signal damage incurred

FOR CT OT
GE43'27

Inclosure

was in the ICS area where a section of waveguide was damaged by weapons fire. Among the enemy captured items were 33 tin can grenades, 15 bamboo covered satchel charges, one RPG-2 (B-40) rocket, and a pair of wire cutters.

(2) On 18 August 1968, at 0240H, Nui Ba Den, a communications site of the 25th Infantry Division, 10 KM Northeast of Tay Ninh City, came under a mortar and ground attack by an unknown size enemy force. At the time of the attack 1st Signal Brigade personnel were on the mountain operating 1st Signal Brigade VHF systems. The strong resistance by site personnel prevented the enemy from overrunning the site as they had done on 13 May 1968. No damage was incurred by communications equipment; however, the enemy did succeed in destroying four perimeter bunkers and damaging five generators thus knocking out communications from 0300H to 0830H. No 1st Signal Brigade casualties were incurred.

c. During the subject quarter the Brigade received the following distinguished visitors:

(1) From 12 August to 17 August 1968, Colonel Wilburn C. Weaver, USA, Deputy Commander, USASTRATCOM-PAC, received orientation briefings by the staff of the 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) and visited USASTRATCOM Communications-Electronics facilities in the Republic of Vietnam for orientation and information.

(2) On 14 August 1968, LTG Frank T. Mildren, USA, Deputy Commanding General USARV received a special briefing on the organization and mission of the 1st Signal Brigade and toured communication facilities at Long Binh Post to include the United States Army Training Facility - 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) and communications facilities at Phu Lam.

(3) From 8 September to 14 September 1968, MG Walter E. Lotz, Jr., USA, Commanding General, USASTRATCOM, conferred with senior commanders and CG, 1st Signal Brigade to assess the progress made in major communications programs executed under STRATCOM management, to coordinate future programming activities to include manning, logistic support, funding and new construction, and to review operational activities of 1st Signal Brigade.

(4) On 12 September 1968, BG Hal C. Pattison, USA, Chief Military History, DA, visited with the CG, 1st Signal Brigade. Discussions were held on the historical programs of the Brigade and on the organization, mission and functions of the 1st Signal Brigade.

(5) On 6 October 1968, BG Harold R. Johnson, USAF, Commander Pacific Communications Area (AFCS) visited with the CG, 1st Signal Brigade. Informal discussions were held on mutual areas of communications interest and the organization, mission and function of the 1st Signal Brigade in Vietnam.

SCCPV-OP-CR
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(6) On 11 October 1968, BG John E. Frizen, USAF, MACV ACofS J-6 visited with the CG, 1st Signal Brigade and received a special projects review by LTC Crawford, Chief, CSEMA.

(7) On 19 October 1968, Colonel Albert Mark, USA, Chief Autodin Project Management Office, DCA visited 1st Signal Brigade with representatives of the Philco-Ford Corporation for an on the ground evaluation of Philco-Ford contractual performances in the AUTODIN program. He and the Philco-Ford representatives received a special briefing from the Operations Directorate Terminal Division on the AUTODIN status within the 1st Signal Brigade.

(8) From 23 October to 25 October 1968, Colonel Dana S. Prescott, USA, Project Manager AACOMS, ECOM, visited 1st Signal Brigade to present briefings on new generation high capacity PCM communications systems and receive on the ground orientation tours of the Army Area Communications System of the 1st Signal Brigade in Vietnam. He received briefings at Brigade headquarters as well as briefings and tours at the 2d and 21st Signal Groups.

d. On 30 September 1968, Brigadier General Thomas Matthew Rienzi, USA, arrived and joined the "First Team" as the Deputy Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade.

e. On 29 September 1968, Colonel Mitchell Goldenthal, USA, arrived and joined the "First Team" as Commanding Officer, I CTZ Signal Group (Provisional).

f. The internal organization of Brigade headquarters is shown at inclosure 1.

g. As of 31 October, the Brigade morning report strength was 18,847. The breakdown of units is shown at inclosure 2.

h. Battalion areas of responsibility are shown at inclosure 3.

i. Significant organizational activities that occurred within each directorate and staff office are detailed below:

(1) Operations Directorate.

(a) Systems.

1 During the reporting period 45 Army Area Systems and 1 DCA System were activated and 17 Army Area Systems and 7 DCS Systems deactivated to keep pace with the constantly changing communications requirements. Some of the significant activations and deactivations are listed below:

SCCPV-OP-CR
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

a. During the month of August, the following systems were activated to upgrade communications in the IV CTZ area:

1. AAW88 (12 channel AN/GRC-50/TCC-7) from Can Tho tc Sa Dec was activated on 8 August.

2. AAW29 (24 channel AN/GRC-50) from Tan An to Duc Hoa was activated on 16 August.

3. AAW30 (24 channel AN/GRC-50) from Tan An to Dong Tam was activated on 16 August.

4. AAW54 (24 channel AN/GRC-50) from Sa Dec to Cao Lanh was activated on 16 August.

5. AAH74 (12 channel AN/TRC-24) from Long Xuyen to Chi Lang Compound was established on 16 August to support the IV CTZ advisors.

6. 77UT20 (24 channel AN/TRC-129A) between Rach Gia and An Thoi was established on 15 September to replace the Air Force AN/TRC-97 with the same terminals.

b. The following significant systems activations also took place in I CTZ:

1. In support of Operation Sommerset Plain involving elements of the 101st Airborne Division air assaulting the A Shau Valley, a twelve channel system was established on 27 July from the 101st Airborne Division Camp Eagle to Eagle's Nest, a site 4,500 ft. above the valley. From this location a 4 channel AN/GRC-10 system was established on 4 August 1st Signal Brigade's LZ Berchestgarden. A second 4 channel AN/GRC-10 system was established from the Eagle's Nest by the 101st Airborne Division Signal Battalion to the 2d Brigade's LZ Zion.

2. BBH6B (4 channel AN/GRC-10) was established in early September from Dong Ha to Camp Carroll using AN/MRC-112's to provide command and control circuitry between the 108th Artillery Group at Dong Ha and its subordinate 2/94th FDC at Camp Carroll.

3. BBH92 (12 channel AN/TRC-24) from Camp Eagle to Fire Bastogne was reterminated at Fire Base Roy during the middle of October when the Fire Base moved. One week later, the other terminal was relocated to LZ Anzio when weather conditions forced changes of base camp area.

4. BBH82 (12 channel AN/TRC 24) between Wunder Beach and Quang Tri Air Base was deactivated on 27 August when Wunder Beach closed operations

during the monsoon season.

c On 21 September, seven 12 channel AN/GRC-50 systems were established from the MACV Gia Dinh Compound in a contingency capacity to link areas in the Saigon - Cholon District with Headquarters MACV.

(b) Terminal

1 Nine new Army AUTODIN terminals were activated within RVN during the quarter as well as one new terminal in Thailand. Most of these new activations were Mode V terminals at nodal points in the Army Area Communications System.

a A double Mode V terminal was activated at Da Nang on 6 August providing direct AUTODIN access for this AACC and its connected tributary stations.

b On 9 and 14 August the Phu Bai and Pleiku AACC double Mode V terminals were activated. Those activations were with the Nha Trang AUTODIN Switch and left only three nodal points still to be activated out of the original eight planned; these remaining were Cu Chi, Can Tho, and Nha Trang.

c The Dong Tam AACC became an AUTODIN subscriber off the Phu Lam AUTODIN Switch on 16 August with the installation of a single Mode V terminal in a vanized configuration. This activation gave the 9th Infantry Division the benefits of AUTODIN service. Similar access was provided first to the 1st Infantry Division with the activation of a fixed Mode V terminal at the Di An AACC on 22 August, and then to the II FFV COMMCEN at Long Binh North on 3 September. These terminals are also tributaries of the Phu Lam AUTODIN Switch. Although the II FFV COMMCEN is operated by II Field Force's organic 53d Signal Battalion, the Mode V AUTODIN terminal is operated and maintained by the 1st Signal Brigade.

d The rapid growth in the number of Mode V terminals operated and maintained by the Brigade compounded the problem of a shortage of functionally trained maintenance personnel. To overcome this difficulty the Brigade began its own training program at the USA Training Facility - 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), at Long Binh on 7 October. A Mode V training terminal was activated on that date to provide the best possible training vehicle for this program. The first class of four 32G's was graduated on 26 October.

e Since the Phu Bai COMMCEN had no facility with which to provide local customers card service and since it was projected that the narrative traffic volume would soon exceed the capacity of the double Mode V terminal, a Mode I (BF/BE) terminal was validated for Phu Bai. No BF terminals were immediately available and hence it was decided to deactivate the low volume Da Nang Support Command terminal and relocated it to Phu Bai. On 9 October this deactivation was accomplished and the Da Nang Support Command began receiving

over-the-counter service from the Da Nang Teletypewriter Relay on that same date. The UNIVAC 1004 van was subsequently moved to Phu Bai where it was activated with the Nha Trang ASC on 22 October, greatly increasing the capabilities of the AACC serving XXIV Corps.

f On 26 October one of the two Mode V terminals installed at the Can Tho AACC was activated with the Phu Lam AUTODIN Switch. Lack of adequate spare parts temporarily precluded the activation of the second terminal. The last two nodal point COMMCEN's (Nha Trang and Cu Chi) as well as the second Can Tho terminal are scheduled to activate Mode V terminals during the next quarter.

g Terminal activations during the quarter brought to 15 the total number of Army operated terminals connected to the Phu Lam AUTODIN Switch while 11 are now connected to the Nha Trang AUTODIN Switch. Including all services, these switches now terminate 21 and 17 subscribers respectively. In addition, Phu Lam obtained a sixth trunk when a 2400 baud circuit was activated between the Phu Lam and Wahiawa AUTODIN Switches on 1 September. In Thailand, a UNIVAC 1004 terminal was installed at the Sattahip Depot complex and cut-over to live traffic on 14 October with the Korat AUTODIN Switch. This terminal is operated by the 29th Signal Group of the 1st Signal Brigade.

h The Phu Lam and Nha Trang AUTODIN Switch Subscriber Diagrams are attached as inclosures 4 and 5.

2 On 21 October 1968 the Saigon Army Area Communications Center was absorbed into the MACV Communications Center. This was accomplished both to provide unified communications support as well as to economize on communications support in the area.

(2) Communications Systems Engineering and Management Agency.

(a) ROKFV "HF" Single Side Band System: The purpose of this system is to provide four channels of HF voice communications between ROKFV Headquarters and the ROK JCS Seoul, Korea. The system was activated on limited operation in September 1968.

(b) ROK "AM" Broadcast Facilities: On 29 June 1968 a local contract was awarded to RCA International Service Company to engineer, furnish, and install five AM radio broadcast stations for the Republic of Korea Forces in Vietnam. The location of the stations are with ROK units at Saigon, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa and Hoi An. During the reporting period the contractor performed site surveys, assembled all equipment at his plant in Camden, N. J. and constructed tower foundations at Saigon and Qui Nhon.

(c) Revetment of Integrated Communications System - Southeast Asia (ICS-SEA) Sites: Modification 44 of Contract DA 28-043-AMC-01693(E)

requires construction of steel revetments at ICS-SEA sites. Difficulties have been encountered in transporting the M8A1 steel matting used to build revetments. On ten occasions, when local transportation offices delivered steel to the site, it was found that part of the shipment was missing. Furthermore, two entire steel shipments were lost because of "insufficient address".

(d) AUTODIN: During the reporting period, this headquarters supervised the installation of twenty-six AUTODIN terminals, eighteen of which were Mode V terminals shipped from CONUS (see also paragraph 14(1)(b)). Difficulties were encountered in the maintenance of AN/FGC-25 supplies from in-country sources.

(e) Tandem Switch Centers (TSC): The Tandem Switch Program is a STRATCOM conceived theater-wide system of automatic switching centers (tandem switches) which will provide a direct-distance-dailing capability to military subscribers throughout Vietnam and Thailand. There are nine tandem switches planned altogether, each of which will be located at a strategic point in SEA and each will provide automatic switching for two of twelve associated dial telephone exchanges (DTE). This program will eventually link 49 DTE's with direct-distance-dailing. The program of constructing buildings, installing equipment and testing nine tandem switches is roughly half complete. Installation is in progress, or is about to begin, at five sites. At the other three sites construction of buildings is in progress. Test evaluation of Bang Pla TSC is complete.

(f) Class IV Projects - Outside Plant: The Outside Plant Section of the Telephone Branch has the responsiblity for engineering Class IV multipair cable projects throughout South Vietnam. Engineering was completed on eleven (11) projects which required the installation of 467,000 feet of multipair cable. Outside Plant has seventeen (17) projects in the engineering phase.

(g) Telephone Inside Plant: Technical Action Requests - 5 (TAR-5) to Contract DA 28-043-AMC-02263(E) and installation of conditioning equipment on Contract DAAB 07-67-C-0480 requires contractor installation of equipment at DCO sites throughout SEA. On numerous occasions when contractor personnel reported to the site to commence installation, it was found that the equipment configuration did not agree with the drawings provided.

(3) Southeast Asia Telephnone Management Agency (SEA-TELMA).

(a) During the reporting period, the Southeast Asia Telephone Management

Agency has been heavily involved in the planning of the Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System (SEA ATS). Three officers and three noncommissioned officers have been on continuous TDY to the Joint Cut Over Integrated Working Group (JCIWG) in Bangkok, Thailand. These personnel have been engaged in the finalization of the Master Cut Over Plan and preparation of the detailed cut over plans required for each of the nine tandem switches. In addition, TELMA supported the efforts of the JCIWG by providing traffic data, plant-in-place drawings, and assisting in the evaluation of proposals which required on-the-ground surveys.

(b) Increased emphasis was placed on the Dial Telephone Exchange Technical and Operational Evaluation program. These evaluations proved to be a positive source of improvement to the telephone system and were well received by the operating units. Team sizes varied according to the size of the exchange but averaged one officer and three enlisted men. Each evaluation included the inside and outside plant (with battery supply and switchboard operations). The initial evaluation was completed for all Army operated dial exchanges in Vietnam. Complete reports of the evaluation were submitted to the appropriate operating unit for information. Subsequent evaluations will require official response relative to those deficiencies noted for the second time.

(c) The Commanding General has elevated the Telephone Management Agency to a Staff level equal to Staff Directorates and the Communications Systems and Engineering Management Agency. This change will more clearly identify SEA TELMA as a unique management element responsible for technical supervision of the Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System. The Chief, SEA TELMA will report directly to the Chief of Staff, 1st Signal Brigade.

(d) SEA TELMA has emphasized the procedures for monitoring, logging out, and restoring common user long distance voice trunks during the period. It became apparent that procedures in force were not effective and were insufficient in some cases. Survey teams were sent to the major manual long distance switchboards to get first hand data on the procedures being followed. Disparities between actual outages and officially reported outages confirmed the requirement for more accurate reporting of degraded voice trunks. Steps are being taken to publish a definitive procedure which outlines in detail when and how a trunk should be logged out and the follow-up required to ensure rapid restoral. Spot checks were made of dial offices and LD switchboards to compare with reported outages. Trunks found to be faulty as a result of test calls were reported to the terminal offices. Review of SOP's and trunk outage logs have also been incorporated into the DTE evaluation check lists.

(e) The Traffic Branch increased the scope of its activities considerably. Although traffic data reported from a number of offices is still incomplete and inaccurate, the agency has been able to determine additional trunk requirements and take the necessary action to request validation and subsequent installation.

SCCPV-OP-CR
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Several special studies were accomplished in support of new tactical unit requirements. Of special significance was the initiation of a special system-wide point-to-point traffic study which was urgently needed to verify the previously validated program. In addition, the initial steps were taken to develop procedures for the recording and reporting of traffic data through the use of the Traffic Usage Recorders (TUR's) provided for the Dial Telephone Exchanges. These procedures will extend over into the tandem switches as well.

(f) The Engineering Branch continued to provide engineering support to the operating units. Of significance were the efforts made to measure and improve the dial central office grounds. This provided on-the-spot improvement in the quality of maintenance and service being provided at the individual exchanges.

(4) Personnel and Training Directorate.

(a) DA staff objections to the establishment of a formalized in-country training base/school were withdrawn during the quarter. As a result, 1st Signal Brigade General Order 676, dated 22 August, formally organized the United States Army Training Facility - 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) (Provisional), formerly known as the Southeast Asia Signal School.

(b) Coordination with USARV and MACV training elements resulted in the following courses being established at the US Army Training Facility:

1 AUTODIN Mode V Maintenance.

2 Switchboard Operator Course (local Nationals).

3 AN/GRC-163 Operator and Maintenance.

4 The existing cable splicer (MOS 36E) course was expanded to incorporate a 100% student increase. Student input is now forty students per class.

(c) Phase II of the construction at the training facility was completed. This completion enabled the facility to provide complete resources to house and train 250 student personnel. Phase III construction has begun. A projected capacity of 350 students will result upon completion of this phase.

(d) Training Division published a training facility catalog during this period. This document contains a complete listing of all courses and prerequisites for student admission to the training facility.

(e) On 15 July 1968 the first safety officers meeting was conducted at brigade level. Representatives from all the groups were present and the USARV Safety Director was invited as a guest speaker. The main topic of the

meeting was the establishment of a standardized brigade driver training program.

(f) During the reporting period, a monthly safety news letter was published. It contained a safety summary of the previous month, common deficiencies noted on safety inspections, latest changes in regulations pertaining to safety, and other helpful hints.

(5) Plans Directorate.

(a) During the reporting quarter the following Signal units arrived in South Vietnam:

1 The 17th Signal Platoon (Construction), organized under TOE 11-276 (63 personnel), arrived in Vietnam on 29 October 1968. This platoon is scheduled to stage at An Khe for approximately one month and then go to Phu Bai where it will be utilized in its TOE mission of cable installation and maintenance throughout the ICTZ.

2 The final element of the 107th Signal Company (Support), organized under TOE 11-117D (350 personnel), arrived in Vietnam on 21 October 1968 and is located at Long Binh. The mission of the 107th Signal Company (Support) is twofold. The primary mission is to provide a contingency force capability for the 1st Signal Brigade. The second mission is to support the 2d Signal Group in the 3d and 4th CTZ's as designated by the CO, 2d Signal Group.

3 The final elements of the 270th Signal Company (Combat Area), organized under TOE 11-87C (172 personnel), arrived in Vietnam on 31 October 1968. This unit is scheduled to stage at An Khe and then deploy to Phu Bai where it will operate and maintain terminal communications for XXIV Corps Headquarters.

4 The 972d Signal Battalion Headquarters (Combat Area), organized under TOE 11-866 (127 personnel), arrived in Vietnam on 29 October 1968. The primary mission of this headquarters is to exercise command and control of the 107th Signal Company and any other unit assigned by the CO, 2d Signal Group.

5 Headquarters USASTRATCOM has published general orders assigning the four recently arrived units to the 1st Signal Brigade. The Brigade will further assign and attach these units as required.

(b) The 232d Signal Company (Combat Area) originally was scheduled to deploy to South Vietnam to provide base camp and area communications in support of operational changes anticipated in the ICTZ. These changes never materialized and consequently the unit deployment to South Vietnam was cancelled. As a result of this unit being deleted from the USARV force structure, Headquarters, USARV sent a message to USARPAC requesting that the associated 172 spaces be applied toward COMSEC Logistics requirements.

SCCPV-OP-CR
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) Since 1962, there has been a continued buildup of Free World military forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Closely associated with this buildup has been the growth of the communications effort in support of these forces. This rapid growth has brought with it certain command and control problems and the need to operate communications facilities in a manner which is not provided for in basic TOE organizations. For this reason a major reorganization of the 1st Signal Brigade in Vietnam is required. Details of the concept are attached as Inclosure 6 (note that the Inclosures to this concept plan are presently under revision). The concept plan for the reorganization of the 1st Signal Brigade in Vietnam has been approved by DA and authorization documents reflecting this reorganization will be prepared and submitted through Headquarters USASTRATCOM to DA during the 2d and 3d quarters of FY 69. As mentioned in the concept plan, the span of control within the 21st Signal Group has become too great. The 21st Signal Group presently has six battalions assigned and is deployed over two-thirds of South Vietnam. It has also become evident that an additional group headquarters is required to provide command and control of the Signal elements in the ICTZ. Consequently, a group headquarters was formed provisionally on 8 September 1968. As soon as this group headquarters becomes operational, it will assume responsibility for area communications support in the ICTZ and will command the 37th and 63d Signal Battalions, now part of the 21st Signal Group.

(d) The 29th Signal Group in Thailand is also undergoing a reorganization to better define areas of responsibility and to develop TDA authorization documents for the operating elements and TOE authorization documents for the battalion and group command elements. Details of the concept of reorganization are attached as Inclosure 7 (note that the Inclosure to this concept plan are presently under revision also). This will permit total documentation and provide the 29th Signal Group Commander with a highly flexible reponsive organization with which to provide communications-electronics support in Thailand. The concept plan for the reorganization of the 29th Signal Group has been approved by DA and authorization documents reflecting this reorganization have been prepared and submitted to Headquarters, USASTRATCOM.

(e) OPLAN 19-69 (ASC Restoral Plan) was published 28 August 1968. This plan is based on a "yet to be published" DCA-PAC OPLAN covering restoral actions for all AUTODIN ASC's in the Pacific Theater. 1st Signal Brigade OPLAN 19-69 specifically addresses action to be taken in the event that the Phu Lam ASC is partially or totally incapacitated. A separate annex will be published for Nha Trang ASC and Army responsibilities in the event the Korat ASC (O&M responsibility of USAF) becomes inoperative. This OPLAN is a interim course of action effective thru January 1969. The fielding of Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment (DSTE), effective in RVN in early 1969, will require an entirely new concept in ASC restoral. This guidance will be promulgated by DCA-PAC, and the 1st Signal Brigade OPLAN will be revised accordingly.

(f) OPLAN 88-69 (Phase-Down/Phase-Out of the Nha Trang Major Relay) is one of a series of plans deactivating major torn-tape relays and non-automatic

relay centers (NARC). This OPLAN is based on the USASTRATCOM Development Plan (formerly Mid-Range Plan 70). With the advent of AUTODIN, manual and semiautomatic relay centers are becoming obsolete. Additionally, the Army Area COMMCEN (AACC) backbone system serves both as concentrator for access to the AUTODIN system and as an emergency restoral network in the event of ASC failure. The OPLAN addresses the disposition of personnel, equipment and real estate. An exact date has not been established due to certain unresolved problems with subscriber retermination. It is anticipated that these problems will be resolved prior to 31 January 1969.

(g) OPLAN 82-69 (C-E Augmentation to XXIV Corps) was distributed on 8 October 1968 (The XXIV Corps has no organic Signal units). The OPLAN provides for prepositioning of certain signal assets with the 63d Signal Battalion to satisfy contingency mission requirements within the corps area. The prepositioning of this equipment will increase responsiveness of Signal support in the XXIV Corps area to meet emergency requirements.

(h) OPLAN 84-69 (Signal Contingency Force) establishes Signal units that can be deployed to meet contingency requirements. At present, this force is composed of a battalion headquarters company, a Signal company (Area Support) and four (4) microwave/Tropo Terminal Teams. All of these units with the exception of the microwave/Tropo Teams, are new units which arrived in-country by the close of the reporting period. The contingency force can be readily deployed in increments from teams to company size units, thus providing the 1st Signal Brigade with a quick reaction capability to cope with emergency situations.

(6) Intelligence and Security.

(a) Reports of Security Violations: During the reporting period this headquarters received notification of eight security violations. This is a significant decrease from previous quarters. Actions which have helped to bring about this reduction include:

1. Continuing contact by members of the 1st Signal Brigade Intelligence and Security Office with their counterparts in subordinate units which insures command emphasis on the security of defense information.

2. Assignment of a Cryptographic Technician to the Intelligence and Security Office whose responsibility includes evaluation of security violations to denote developing trends.

(b) Processing Reports of Investigations: This quarter a letter was distributed to all subordinate commands emphasizing the proper preparation of these reports. Included with the letter was a check list to be completed by the investigating officer.

SECPV-OP-CR
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) Physical Security of Isolated Sites: On 30 September 1968, 1st Signal Brigade Letter, subject: Defense Measures for Signal Sites was distributed to subordinate units. This letter outlines steps a commander should take to insure an effective defense posture and combines the applicable portions of publications prepared both by higher headquarters as well as 1st Signal Brigade.

(7) Engineer.

(a) On 1 August the United States Army Construction Agency Vietnam (USAECAV) assumed responsibility of the operation and maintenance (O&M) of generators and air conditioners at ICS-SEA sites. Actual take-over is programmed to be completed 14 December.

(b) On 18 August the air conditioner compressor motor at the Qui Nhon Army Area Communications Center failed. By 31 October, USAECAV was still unable to obtain repair parts or a replacement motor. Throughout the air conditioning failure, the communications center operated on tactical air conditioners brought in from outlying units.

(c) On 22 August Long Binh Post Base Development Board approved relocation of the construction of Long Binh Army Area Communications Center farther inside the perimeter. USAECAV began redesign of the site plan and redesign of the interior layout to allow transfer of the Phu Lam DCS Teletype Relay to the Long Binh Army Area Communications Center.

(d) On 13 September MACV issued to the Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) a construction directive for the Nha Trang Crypto Facility. Site location changes in Nha Trang still delay this project.

(e) On 15 September contract construction of the Can Tho and Long Binh AUTOSEVOCOMs was completed.

(f) On 3 October OICC completed design of the CSEMA Storage Facility.

(g) On 8 October OICC completed design of the Long Binh Area Maintenance Support Facility.

(h) On 15 October OICC completed redesign of the Long Binh Communications Center. Drawings were sent to the United States Army Communications Systems Agency (USACSA) for review.

(i) On 20 October USAECAV, working through its architectural and engineering firm (Leo A. Daly Co.) completed studies of environmental conditions at the Nha Trang and Phu Lam Automatic Switching Centers. The findings of the studies will be used by 1st Signal Brigade to correct a long history of unsatisfactory environmental conditions inside the Switching Centers.

SCCFV-OP-CR
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR -65 (R1) (U)

(8) Inspector General.

(a) During the reporting period the following units received inspections during the times indicated:

UNIT	TYPE	DATES
Headquarters, 2d Signal Gp	AGI, FY 69	14 - 15 August 1968
86th Signal Battalion	AGI, FY 69	19 - 22 August 1968
194th MP Company (PS)	AGI, FY 69	29 - 30 August 1968
Co D, 40th Signal Battalion	Special Reinspection	10 September 1968
334th Signal Company	AGI, FY 69	16 September 68
347th Signal Company	AGI, FY 69	17 - 18 September 1968
Bangkok Facility	AGI, FY 69	19 - 21 September 1968
Headquarters, 29th Signal Gp	AGI, FY 69	23 - 25 September 1968
Phu Lam Signal Battalion	AGI, FY 69	1 - 3 October 1968
HHC 1st Signal Brigade	AGI, FY 69	7 - 11 October 1968
Headquarters, 69th Signal Bn	AGI, FY 69	14 - 17 October 1968
Nha Trang Signal Battalion	AGI, FY 69	22 - 24 October 1968
Headquarters, 21st Signal Gp	AGI, FY 69	25 - 26 October 1968

(b) There were three special inquires conducted during this period.

(c) Action on eighteen (18) complaints and fifty-five (55) requests for assistance was completed by the Inspector General (USASTRATCOM) during the reporting period. Nine (9) complaints and nineteen (19) requests for assistance received during the period are still pending final action.

(9) Comptroller.

(a) 1 September 1968: CCPVR 11-1, Review and Analysis. This regulation was completely revised and made more effective in the first quarter FY 69. Due to the lateness of publication, certain reporting requirements under the new regulation were postponed until 2d quarter FY 69, and the counterpart sections of the former USA regulation were substituted.

(b) 29 October 1968: CCPVR 10-1, Organization and Functions Manual. The Brigade mission, organization and functions study, initiated in July, culminated in a proposed revision to the Organization and Functions Manual, which was approved by the Chief of Staff. Several recent major changes in the Brigade structure necessitated further revision. The Office of the Comptroller is updating the manual with the revision inputs and publication will be in early November.

(c) 15 - 29 October 1968: Review and Analysis Presentations. The scheduled Review and Analysis presentations for 1st quarter FY 69 were conducted as follows:

15 October - 29th Signal Group

20 October - Regional Communications Group

22 October - 160th Signal Group

24 October - 2d Signal Group

29 October - 21st Signal Group

All presentations were well organized and rehearsed. A significant comments transcript was prepared for each presentation.

(d) FY 1969 Funding Status as of 31 October 1968.

1 The FY 69 Annual Operating Budget (AOB) will be insufficient to fund for all the Brigade's requirements. The AOB of $3,086,000 is composed of:

a	Budget Program 2000 (Other Combat Support Units)	$352,000
b	Budget Program 2900 (Army-Wide Communications and US Army Audio Visual Activities)	$2,734,000

2 Requests were submitted to STRATCOM-PAC for an increase of $49,000 and of $600,000 in BP2900 for the second quarter. These funds have been approved by STRATCOM, per FONECON with Mr. Amano of the Comptroller's Office STRATCOM-PAC on 31 October 1968.

3 It is presently anticipated that the Brigade will have expanded 80% of its BP2000 funds and 70% of its BP2900 monies by 31 December 1968. Clearly, an increase of the FY 69 AOB will be necessitated for the Brigade to meet its financial obligations, most of which are fixed in nature.

(10) Adjutant General: The overall R&R utilization rate during the past 3 months was 89.6% (Aug. 89.6%; Sep. 94%; Oct. 85.2%). The utilization rate for this quarter represents a slight decrease over the utilization rate for the period May, June, and July.

2. (U) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operations.

(1) Dirty teletypewriter contacts.

(a) OBSERVATION. Many times after installing the complete Mode V AUTODIN terminal, to include locally supplied AN/FGC-25, the testers found that the teletypewriter would run open.

(b) EVALUATION. After checking all wiring and voltages the testers usually determined the trouble to be within the teletypewriters themselves. Upon examination the trouble was found to be dirty or pitted contacts in the TD as a result of improper, or lack of, maintenance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the TD contacts be checked if the AN/FGC-25 runs open after installation completion. It is also recommended that this problem and its solution be widely disseminated and be a subject of maintenance inspections.

(2) Project Concurrence letters.

(a) OBSERVATION. While attempting to complete the engineering of several cable projects, the submission of project concurrence letters had been overlooked. This resulted in confusion in delineating areas of responsibility for the completion of these projects.

(b) EVALUATION. Ultimately, the time wasted in confusion far exceeded the time saved by not writing these letters. Conversely, fewer problems were encountered when project concurrence letters were submitted.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That project concurrence letters be submitted with every project prior to the start of construction to delineate areas of responsibility of all concerned.

(3) Inadequate or Absent Central Office Ground.

(a) OBSERVATION. In almost all cases, operating units fail to realize the importance of a good ground and the impact it has on the quality of service being provided.

(b) EVALUATION. An inadequate or absent central office ground can result in a voltage potential which causes noise in the talking path and improper operation of signaling and control circuits.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That operating units stress attention to the effectiveness of central office grounds. The resistance to ground should be measured periodically with a ground megger and every effort should be made to achieve a ground which measures 5 ohms or less.

(4) Guidance on AUTOSEVOCOM Circuit Cutover Standards.

(a) OBSERVATION. During the past quarter, it was noted that units were not, as a rule, providing circuits of suitable quality for final AUTOSEVOCOM conditioning. This resulted in conditioning teams being held up at many sites while corrections were made to bring circuits within acceptable standards.

(b) EVALUATION. It was determined that there was not sufficient guidance to the personnel establishing the circuits as to standards required and methods to achieve these standards. A short guide has been compiled and distributed, which provides requirements and tips on how to meet them. This guide should prove invaluable in upgrading the circuits and expediting the installation of AUTOSEVOCOM equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Commands should ensure that sufficient information is made available to all individuals installing AUTOSEVOCOM circuits.

(5) Change of Analysis of Teletype Statistics.

(a) OBSERVATION. During this quarter a close inspection was made into the manner in which tape relay statistics were being analyzed and presented. It was not felt that a true picture of performance was being presented.

(b) EVALUATION. It was learned by review that one important area of concern was not being considered in the measure of tape relay performance. That area was the service rate on messages transmitted from stations into a major tape relay. Analysis revealed that many of the stations were having an excessive number of messages serviced. Analysis of the reason for the service messages indicated that the stations were making many errors in message format which in turn caused rejects of messages when they reached the AUTODIN. Deeper analysis indicated certain trends in types of errors being made which indicated equipment problems on circuit paths. This change in data being analyzed resulted in improved operation on site and in improvement in the quality of messages received.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. As new systems and equipment are added to the inventory in Vietnam, changes in analysis techniques must be made to insure proper evaluation of the new system and the manner in which it effects the older systems. This headquarters recommends that additional emphasis be placed both on the evaluation of the new equipment being introduced and on providing a constant review of existing analysis techniques to insure measurement of significant items.

(6) Right of Way for Cable Construction.

(a) OBSERVATION. Several incidents have been noted of underground and aerial cable construction projects commencing without proper coordination.

(b) EVALUATION. Construction which proceeds without coordination usually gets stopped, thus causing men and equipment to be idle. For example, failure to coordinate right of way will usually result in work stoppage demanded by the tennant units or agencies until proper right of way permission has been formally requested, staffed, and given. Failure to get prior coordination for engineer support to prepare and repair the cable route causes delay since engineer units cannot respond without prior notification to requests for support. Cable projects are not finished until the cable route has been restored to its original state. Prior coordination with engineers is necessary for prompt restoral of the cable route after the cable is buried.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A standard procedure should be developed and disseminated to all commands for coordination of cable projects through a single contact office such as the area/command engineer (e.g., I FFV Engineer, XXIV Corps Engineer etc.).

(7) Loss of Record Traffic.

(a) OBSERVATION. An evaluation of all lost messages within the 1st Signal Brigade during the past six months indicates that approximately 80% of all messages lost were messages that required some type of service action prior to the loss.

(b) EVALUATION. A review of station handling procedures has indicated that some facilities have not established adequate SOP's which spell out exact procedures to be followed for each action required on messages requiring service action. Incomplete procedures as well as failure to follow correct procedures can and do result in loss of record traffic.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. All communications center procedures in signal schools should be reviewed to determine adequacy of instruction in all types of service messages and service actions required. Training in service section procedures at the signal schools as well as all other message handling procedures should be amplified in the courses of instruction.

c. Training

(1) Mode V Training

(a) OBSERVATION. To offset the disadvantages of sending Brigade personnel to attend the Taiwan Training Facility and to provide a nucleus of in-country trained 32G personnel, the Brigade established a 21 day Mode V Maintenance course at the US Army Training Facility - 1st Signal Brigade. Designed for a four student input, this course will continue only as long as the requirement exists or until such time as the CONUS training base can meet the Brigade personnel requirements.

(b) EVALUATION. Out-of-country training in a short tour area is not desirable due to excessive per diem costs and prolonged absence of Brigade personnel from their assigned duties. Concentrated training at a centralized in-country facility achieves the desired results at less expense.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(2) Emergency Action Console (EAC) Training

(a) OBSERVATION.

1. A New Equipment Training (NET) team conducted a four week course at Headquarters, MACV, USARV and MACTHAI during the period of 4 March to 21 June 1968. Ten Brigade personnel stationed in RVN received this training, however, six have either departed or are scheduled to rotate prior to 1 November 1968.

2. New equipment training teams are provided on a one time basis to train key personnel. This is usually initiated as an interim means between the in-country arrival of the equipment and the time frame alloted to CONUS for infusing the training into the appropriate MOS course.

3. Information available to this headquarters reveals that EAC training is not as yet available in CONUS. This places the burden on the Brigade to continue training with limited personnel on operational equipment.

(b) EVALUATION. NET teams must train all operator and maintenance

personnel who will be associated with new equipment. The concept of training only a small nucleus with which the Brigade is supposed to perpetuate a continuous training program is valid so long as the requirement does not exceed our limited training capabilities. Resources and facilities are not available in-country to conduct instruction on every piece of new equipment programmed into the communications network.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(3) AN/TRC-97B Training

(a) OBSERVATION.

1. USARV has asked 1st Signal Brigade to conduct a tropospheric scatter (AN/TRC-97B) operator course for personnel of the Corps Signal Battalion. This course is being conducted at Nha Trang, RVN.

2. The prerequisite MOS for this course is MOS 26L. The Division TO&E's, however, are not authorized this MOS. Hence MOS 31M personnel must be substituted for this training. MOS 31M is a radio relay and carrier attendant who has not received previous training on tropo equipment. Additional training has had to be added to the training program due to the inability of MOS 31M to adequately comprehend tropospheric scatter technology.

(b) EVALUATION. Timely notice must be received by organizations not possessing required MOS's when new equipment is expected in RVN, so that necessary action toward requisitioning the proper personnel and changing TO&E's may be initiated. Personnel not possessing the desired prerequisites can be expected to operate and maintain the equipment only on an interim basis pending the receipt of qualified personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(4) Driver Training Program.

(a) OBSERVATION. Since the implementation of the brigade driver training program, the motor vehicle accident rate for the brigade continually decreased each month during the reporting period. The motor vehicle accident rate was reduced by approximately 40% over the previous reporting period.

(b) EVALUATION. The importance of an effective driver training program, specifically designed for the driving conditions in Vietnam and Thailand was clearly realized.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Driver training programs designed for driving conditions in Vietnam and Thailand should receive emphasis throughout commands and be a special item of interest on all safety inspections.

d. Intelligence None.

e. Logistics.

(1) Shipment of Construction Material - Revetment Steel.

(a) OBSERVATION. In each instance where revetment steel for ICS-SEA sites was lost, the shipment had not been escorted.

(b) EVALUATION. M8A1 steel matting is a very versatile construction material and therefore is often subject to pilferage.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all shipments of bulk construction material be escorted to insure arrival at the proper destination.

(2) Accountability of Equipment - Tandem Switching Centers (TSC)

(a) OBSERVATION. Accounting for installation equipment has been a big problem area to date.

(b) EVALUATION. When equipment is shipped from the contractor's location in CONUS it becomes a government responsibility. Upon arriving in SEA, these boxes of equipment are stored adjacent to the tandem switch building. When the building is completed, the equipment is removed from boxes and installed in the TSC. Upon completion of installation the military service involved (i.e., Army or Air Force) then signs for the complete Tandem Switch Center. At no time during the transporting and installing of this equipment is it accounted for by the government or the contractor.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That accountability guides and procedures which have recently been implemented by the Secondary Administrative Contracting Officer in Saigon, be used to overcome this accountability problem.

(3) Shipment of Materials from CONUS.

(a) OBSERVATION. In many instances items were misdelivered or lost when the material for the eighteen Mode V terminals was sent to the using units. Brigade personnel spent an inordinate amount of time tracing

shipment of BOM, many times unsuccessfully.

(b) EVALUATION. The method of shipment was not at fault. The items were lost usually at their destination. They are either not picked up by the unit or were delivered to the wrong unit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all future AUTODIN shipments be made to the 1st Signal Brigade's own cable yard, AT8686, and be escorted from there to the installation site.

(4) Radio Repeater AN/TRC-110

(a) OBSERVATION. Internal shorts have occurred in the AN/TRC-110 radio repeater shelters. An investigation of the problem revealed that the short was caused by contact between the power panel face plate and the metal lens cover which protrudes through the face plate. This problem also applies to the AN/TRC-117 Radio Terminal, AN/TCC-60 Telephone Terminal, and AN/TCC-61 Telephone Terminal Equipment.

(b) EVALUATION. The metal lens covers have the same voltage potential as the (white) lead into the van. The face plate has the same voltage potential as the ground (green) lead into the van. If a difference in potential exists between common and ground, a definite hazard exists. A person accidentally touching the lens cover and ground at the same time could be electrocuted. The units having AACOMS equipment were notified of this problem. USAECOM reported that this problem will be rectified on all new procurements of AACOMS equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The following solution will eliminate the hazard on shelter facilities that have the power indicating lights on a stand-off bracket from the neutral bus:

1 Disconnect the stand-off bracket.

2 Place behind the bracket where attached to neutral bus a non-metallic washer.

3 Reattach stand-off bracket with Nylon (8-32) screws. Do not use metal screws.

4 Attach a ground strap from bracket to ground stud in power panel (where green wire is attached).

(5) Red Ball Express Requisitioning

(a) OBSERVATION. Problems have been encountered in obtaining parts for deadlined equipment.

(b) EVALUATION. The primary cause for the nonavailability of parts is the unit's failure to properly manage their requisitions. There is an apparent lack of knowledge, at the unit level, of the mechanics of the Red Ball Express system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The 1st Logistical Command should conduct a course of instruction in the Red Ball Express system and each operating unit appoint a Red Ball project officer to attend these classes.

f. Organization. None.

g. Other.

(1) Safety News Letter

(a) OBSERVATION. Discussions with safety officers at all levels of command within the brigade revealed that the monthly safety newsletter published by this headquarters was most beneficial.

(b) EVALUATION. This newsletter presented safety information on an informal basis, pointing out key portions of pertinent safety regulations that either were not read in detail or were not on hand. Additionally, the safety summaries and reviews were found to provide safety officers with statistics such that comparisons could be made between subordinate units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Safety newsletters should be adopted by commands as a means of providing additional safety education within their unit on an informal basis.

7 Incl
as
Incl 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 w/d Hq, DA

W. M. VAN HARLINGEN
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

SCCPV-OP-CR
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DISTRIBUTION:

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army Washington, D. C. 20310
Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, ATTN: DCSOPS, SCC-OPS-RT, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613
Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command - Pacific, ATTN: SCCP-OP, APO 96557

AVHGC-DST (21 Nov 68) 1st Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

13 JAN 69

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning dirty teletypewriter contacts, page 16, paragraph 2b(1): Concur. This information was placed in the December issue of the Command Communications Pamphlet for dissemination.

b. Reference item concerning change of analysis of teletype statistics, page 17, paragraph 2b(5): Concur in recommendation. These problems and recommended improvement techniques were presented at the bi-monthly signal officers conference on 21 November 1968 in which all key signal officers in Vietnam attended.

c. Reference item concerning right of way cable construction, page 18, paragraph 2b(6). Right of way for cable construction located on US installations is obtained by submission of a project request to the Installation Base Development Board. Right of way for cable construction located on other than US controlled real estate is obtained through the procedures set forth in USARV Regulation 405-1 and MACV Directive 405-1, Real Estate Policy and Procedures. The unit will be so advised.

d. Reference item Concerning loss of record traffic, page 18, paragraph 2b(7): Concur. Recommend that instruction at CONUS signal schools stress the importance of proper message handling procedures and particularly service message procedures.

e. Reference item concerning emergency action console (EAC) training, page 19, paragraph 2c(2): Concur. Recommend a maintenance course be established in CONUS to train personnel in EAC maintenance.

AVHGC-DST (21 Nov 68) 1st Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

f. Reference item concerning accountability of equipment-tandem switching centers, (TSC) page 21, paragraph 2e(2): Concur. The accountability guides and procedures established by the contracting officer resolves the stated problem.

g. Reference item concerning shipment of materials from CONUS, page 21, paragraph 2e(3): Concur. Shipping instructions have been provided to ECOM by the Communication Systems Agency, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) has dispatched a message to CSA requesting all future shipments be directed to AT8686. The ECOM NICP has also been advised through the supply assistance representative.

h. Reference item concerning red ball express requisitioning, page 23, paragraph 2e(5): Concur. This headquarters will task the 1st Logistical Command to implement this recommendation. Units will be allowed to nominate their own attendees.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant General

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Sig Bde (USASTRATCOM)

GPOP-DT (21 Nov 68) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Sig Bde (USASTRATCOM) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

FRED E. HANSARD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

ORGANIZATION OF 1st SIGNAL BRIGADE (USASTRATCOM)

MISSION: TO PERFORM COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS FUNCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF U.S. MILITARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES IN SEA AS DIRECTED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.



------- COMMAND LESS OPERATIONAL CONTROL

* - OPERATIONAL CONTROL HQS, 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE

∇ - TO BECOME OPERATIONAL IN NOV OR DEC 1968

(P)- PROVISIONAL UNIT

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL 2b. GROUP 4

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1968.

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

CG, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM)

6. REPORT DATE 21 Nov 1968	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 31	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. b. PROJECT NO. c. N/A d.	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 684327 9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

29

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification